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Disclaimer of Liability 
 
The authors and the National Centre for Forensic Studies, Canberra draw the reader’s attention 
to section 5 of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License: 
 
a. Unless otherwise separately undertaken by the Licensor, to the extent possible, the 
Licensor offers the Licensed Material as-is and as-available, and makes no 
representations or warranties of any kind concerning the Licensed Material, whether 
express, implied, statutory, or other. This includes, without limitation, warranties of 
title, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, non-infringement, absence of 
latent or other defects, accuracy, or the presence or absence of errors, whether or not 
known or discoverable. Where disclaimers of warranties are not allowed in full or in 
part, this disclaimer may not apply to You. 
b. To the extent possible, in no event will the Licensor be liable to You on any legal theory 
(including, without limitation, negligence) or otherwise for any direct, special, indirect, 
incidental, consequential, punitive, exemplary, or other losses, costs, expenses, or 
damages arising out of this Public License or use of the Licensed Material, even if the 
Licensor has been advised of the possibility of such losses, costs, expenses, or damages. 
Where a limitation of liability is not allowed in full or in part, this limitation may not 
apply to You. 
c. The disclaimer of warranties and limitation of liability provided above shall be 
interpreted in a manner that, to the extent possible, most closely approximates an 
absolute disclaimer and waiver of all liability. 
This document does not constitute legal advice.  
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About the National Centre for Forensic Studies 
 
In 2003, Canberra Institute of Technology (CIT), the University of Canberra (UC), and the 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that recognised 
the benefits that could be gained from close collaboration between the three organisations 
with respect to forensic science training, education and research. 
 
The MoU prompted discussions regarding the establishment of a National Centre for Forensic 
Studies (NCFS). The Centre would be ACT-based but would operate at both a local and national 
level. 
 
On 22 August 2007, a Memorandum of Agreement was signed by the three organisations to 
formally establish the NCFS. 
 
NCFS Purpose 
 
To develop and deliver enhanced education, training and research opportunities for the benefit 
of the partner agencies and the wider forensic science community. 
 
NCFS Objectives 
 
The key objectives of the NCFS are to: 
 
 increase collaboration and co-investment on forensic research 
 promote forensic expertise, innovation and service delivery nationally and 
internationally 
 encourage closer collaboration on strategic planning and public policy development, 
workforce planning and training, and 
 actively explore opportunities for cooperation and co-investment in physical, 
information, and communication technology infrastructure development. 
 
Through continuing to invest in our strategic capabilities, the NCFS will position itself to provide 
leadership and contribute to the development of the forensic sciences to support the justice 
system. 
 
The NCFS will, at all times, act in an ethical manner to meet the standards expected by our 
stakeholders and the wider community. 
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NCFS Vision 
 
To be recognised, nationally and internationally, as a valued contributor to the forensic sciences 
through: 
 integrity underpinned by adherence to ethical and professional best practice 
 excellence in training by providing a one-stop shop to meet the needs of students and 
clients 
 innovation in research, development and implementation of technologies relevant to 
the practice of forensic science 
 leadership by contributing to public debate and policy affecting the forensic sciences, 
and 
 development of current practitioners and the future workforce through education and 
training 
 
Areas of Expertise 
 
CIT, UC and the AFP each bring to the NCFS existing strengths and capabilities and are 
identifying and developing synergies for the delivery of a new range of capabilities and services. 
In addition to our core academic courses, the expertise and experience of the partners can be 
utilised to meet the needs of industry clients. 
© National Centre for Forensic Studies, 2017 
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Summary of Recommendations 
 
No Recommendation 
1 Laboratories considering using this Model Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) 
should: 
• Consider whether the approach taken by the authors suits the legislative 
requirements in the laboratory’s own jurisdiction. 
• Adapt and amend the Model PIA to suit specific local requirements, 
technology differences and the applicable legal framework. 
• Circulate and discuss the PIA with relevant local and regional stakeholders.  
• Consider publishing the PIA on their website, or otherwise making it 
accessible to stakeholders and interested members of the public. 
2 Any major change in the technology base for Massively Parallel Sequencing (MPS) 
which, for example, could lead to an operational capability to predict donor 
behaviour or diagnose tendencies, should trigger a new PIA. 
3 Entities considering future technology change beyond the scope of this PIA, such 
as targeting genetic markers for behaviour or whole genome sequencing for 
forensic analysis, should consider whether another PIA is required. 
4 Entities using MPS analysis should ensure that genetic information and, in 
particular, raw genetic data is appropriately secured to prevent unauthorised 
access, use or disclosure. 
5 Entities using MPS analysis should keep court reporting processes and intelligence 
processes distinct, to maximise the opportunities to negotiate during discovery or 
subpoena processes and keep third-party genetic information off the public 
record wherever possible. Entities should also consider potential third-party 
access rights under freedom of information processes, where they are applicable. 
6 When operationalising an MPS platform, entities should give consideration to 
appropriate awareness training for police or investigators. Results or reports from 
MPS platforms should, where practicable, allow for discussions and guidance to 
be given by the scientists to investigators tasked with making operational 
decisions based on the content. Additional explanatory information should also 
be included in reports, where possible, to aide in interpretation. 
7 Any outsourcing or fee-for-service arrangement involving MPS technology should 
give consideration to privacy risks and, in particular, which obligations fall to 
which parties. Auditing or certification requirement could also be used to 
mitigate risk, where appropriate. 
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No Recommendation 
8 Any outsourcing, fee-for-service or other collaboration involving MPS should give 
careful consideration to risks of secondary use, such as the diversion of genetic 
data into research and development initiatives without informed consent. Similar 
considerations may apply where an operational laboratory runs an in-house 
research and development program. 
9 Where an entity proposes to use MPS technology for reference samples, 
consideration should be given to deriving genetic information only from DNA 
markers useful for comparison purposes. Where this is not feasible, externally 
visible characteristics (EVC), bio-geographical ancestry (BGA) or any other medically 
sensitive information should be segmented with access restricted at the earliest 
opportunity during the analysis process. 
10 Entities should consider relevant privacy safeguards when analysing samples of 
mixed origin using an MPS platform, where there is a known contributor such as a 
victim of crime. Similar policies of segmenting and restricting access to EVC, BGA or 
other medically sensitive information in raw genetic data should, whenever it is 
feasible, apply at the earliest opportunity during the analysis process. 
11 Entities moving to an MPS platform should review their policies and procedures 
concerning obtaining consent from individuals, particularly volunteers, and 
whether any changes are needed to inform those consenting of any relevant new 
capabilities of an MPS platform.  
12 An entity should consider whether to include, in any relevant consent form, 
information about rights of access to personal information. The entity should also 
consider advising donors that the entity will not proactively release any 
information as to health status, even if this health information is readily apparent 
from the genetic information. 
13 An entity should ensure that, before using MPS operationally, the agency’s privacy 
policy or other relevant governance provides necessary guidance about the use to 
which the agency may put genetic information obtained from discarded DNA. 
Importantly, this policy should specify that the entity will not proactively release 
genetic information or information as to health status, even if the donor of the 
sample later becomes known and even if this health information is readily 
apparent from the genetic information. Consideration should be given to how this 
aligns with any statutory requirement to release copies of results to the donor. 
14 Entities should ensure that their implementation of MPS considers the possibility 
of inadvertent release of information such as biological parentage or genetic 
ancestry information, and mitigate this risk if possible. Entities should also balance 
the ‘right not to know’ with investigative priorities if considering the use of health 
information for identification purposes. 
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No Recommendation 
15 Entities should ensure that, before using MPS operationally, the agency’s privacy 
policy is reviewed to ensure that there are no express assurances of anonymity or 
pseudonymity in relation to forensic identification sciences. 
16 Entities adopting MPS in a staged manner, and later broadening application to 
more crime types or for the more efficient analysis of reference samples, should 
consider whether a new PIA is necessary. See also Recommendation 9. 
17 Entities should ensure that processes for the handling of electronic and hardcopy 
records containing genetic information meet all relevant security standards and 
requirements, as well as any data retention or archiving requirements. 
18 Entities should consider gathering feedback on any MPS analysis provided to 
investigators, and to consider strategies to enhance reporting and privacy 
compliance. 
19 Entities should ensure that their privacy processes include steps to be taken in the 
event of a suspected genetic ‘data spill’ (deliberate or inadvertent), including 
taking all reasonable steps to contain any breach. 
20 Entities should consider their approach to deleting or tightly restricting genetic 
data, in cases where it is possible to make an assessment that it does not (or no 
longer) has any probative value. 
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Background 
 
This Model Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) considers the introduction of forensic phenotyping 
and a move towards forensic genomics through a privacy lens. The Model PIA considers the 
privacy challenges and benefits, and puts forward some mitigation strategies to reduce 
identified risks.  
 
Purpose of the model PIA 
 
The Model PIA is a starting point for laboratories in the process of implementing new DNA 
capabilities based on massively parallel sequencing (MPS) or considering the use of forensic 
genomics more broadly. While intended to have broad application, the Model PIA must be 
adapted to individual laboratory requirements. 
 
The PIA process is applied in many countries, and the approach to developing a PIA would 
generally be a good basis to consider privacy implications, even in jurisdictions where PIAs are 
uncommon. However, each jurisdiction has its own requirements in terms of privacy and legal 
risk, and a different approach may be required. 
 
Consultation is a key component of the development of a PIA. While the Model PIA is the result 
of considerable stakeholder input, a proposal to implement new technology having a bearing 
on privacy should trigger consultation with institutional, local and regional stakeholders. 
Laboratories considering implementing enhanced DNA capabilities based on forensic genomics 
should consider which stakeholders should be consulted on the appropriateness of privacy and 
legal safeguards. This could include: 
 
• Local and regional law enforcement agencies; 
• Institution and government policy areas; 
• The Judiciary; 
• Prosecution services or the office of the District Attorney; 
• Victim advocacy groups; 
• Inmate support groups; and 
• Privacy advocacy groups. 
 
The development of a PIA should be a transparent process. Laboratories should consider 
publishing their PIAs on their institution’s website or otherwise making the final PIA document 
accessible to stakeholders and the public. 
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Scope 
 
Legislative framework 
 
The Model PIA is a generic document, but has been developed with some consideration of its 
applicability under the following frameworks: 
 
• Australia (Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), incorporating the Australian Privacy Principles); 
• the United Kingdom (Data Protection Act 1988, incorporating the UK Data Protection 
Principles); 
• Europe, through the European Union Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC; 
• the United States (the Privacy Act of 1974 5 U.S.C. § 552a, noting that it applies only to 
federal government department, corporations or establishments); and 
• Japan (the Act on the Protection of Personal Information held by Administrative Organs 
1988). 
 
Existing state 
 
The Model PIA considers the changes in the collection, use and disclosure of genetic 
information arising from the adoption of MPS or of a laboratory otherwise moving to make use 
of ‘coding’ regions of DNA. While phenotype prediction can apply to the interpretation of any 
human characteristic encoded in DNA, including health information of the donor, the term 
‘forensic phenotyping’ is used in this Model PIA to distinguish the prediction of characteristics 
useful to forming an hypothesis as to an individual’s identity. These forensic phenotypes are 
predominantly externally visible physical features.  
 
Forensic DNA analysis, using a select number of DNA loci for comparative purposes, was first 
used in 1987 in the United Kingdom. It was first used in the United States in 1989 and Australia 
in 1990.[1] 
 
Recommendation 1 
Laboratories considering using this Model PIA should: 
• Consider whether the approach taken by the authors suits the legislative requirements in 
the laboratory’s own jurisdiction. 
• Adapt and amend the Model PIA to suit specific local requirements, technology 
differences and the applicable legal framework. 
• Circulate and discuss the PIA with relevant local and regional stakeholders.  
• Consider publishing the PIA on their website, or otherwise making it accessible to 
stakeholders and interested members of the public. 
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The Model PIA does not consider the privacy implications of this existing use of identity 
markers. Nor does it consider other developments in DNA analysis over this period, including 
field portable DNA capabilities and the use of databases to store and compare DNA profiles. 
 
This current use of DNA, while having evolved considerably in the last thirty years, is considered 
a baseline for the purposes of this privacy analysis. As such, this Model PIA considers what 
would change, from a privacy perspective, if a forensic laboratory replaced or supplemented its 
use of identity markers for DNA analysis with MPS or forensic genomic capabilities. 
 
This Model PIA does not consider the use of phenotyping for behavioural prediction. While 
there may be forensically relevant information that can be drawn from making predictions as to 
a diagnosis concerning an individual’s behaviour or tendencies, current MPS capabilities are not 
presently set up to undertake this analysis. Given such predictive capabilities, if developed, are 
many years from operational use, this Model PIA will consider current and short-term 
technology developments. 
 
 
  
Recommendation 2 
Any major change in the technology base for MPS which, for example, could lead to an 
operational capability to predict donor behaviour or diagnose tendencies, should trigger a new 
PIA. 
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Technical Description 
 
Current State 
 
DNA analysis for law enforcement and forensic purposes has been in widespread use since the 
late-1990s.[2] This early adoption of DNA came with assertions that the points of analysis 
within the human genome constituted so-called ‘junk DNA’.[3] This assertion has since been 
challenged, and certain variants detected with existing kits and markers can identify sensitive 
medical information and inherited genetic traits.  
 
Despite these limitations, comparative DNA analysis has, over a period of about thirty years, 
shown itself to be a forensic tool with a high degree of genetic privacy compliance.  
 
Privacy compliance is achieved through a range of internal laboratory practices and oversight 
mechanisms. In addition, once entered into a local or national DNA database, use of DNA 
profile information is often constrained by legislation or policy. By focusing on a numerical 
representation of short tandem repeats, most suited to upload and comparison in databases, 
forensic DNA analysis has largely side-stepped the issue of genetic privacy up until this point in 
time. There has been little incentive for individual laboratories or police agencies to move away 
from consistent, core DNA markers which can be readily compared to the same markers from 
unsolved crimes, suspects and convicted offenders. 
 
 
Massively Parallel Sequencing and Forensic Genomics 
 
Advances in genetic analysis have led to a generational shift in DNA processing capabilities. 
Laboratories are beginning to adopt new DNA systems based on Massively Parallel Sequencing 
(MPS). Drawing on medical research capabilities, MPS platforms allow for cost efficient analysis 
of an exponentially larger number of DNA markers. MPS has a range of uses, including genomic 
analysis of gene mutation associated with disease.[4, 5] In a forensic context, MPS can be 
beneficial in processing degraded DNA samples or providing raw data useful for the analysis of 
DNA mixtures. However, its most profound contribution will be in enabling investigators to 
predict genetically derived characteristics from genetic material of unknown origin. 
 
It is logical to predict that forensic laboratories will continue to use existing DNA capabilities, or 
similar comparison-based genetic analysis using MPS, given that most crimes occur between 
people known to each other.[6] However, MPS is already proving itself a useful tool when 
traditional comparison based DNA fails to identify a suspect or convicted offender. 
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Information Flows 
 
How is the genetic information collected? 
 
The process of collecting DNA samples will not change through the introduction of MPS. 
Forensic laboratories are primarily adopting massively parallel sequencing (MPS) for use with 
unsolved crime scene samples.[7] DNA samples are generally collected by swabbing surfaces 
with which a suspect may have had contact, such as a door handle or a bladed weapon, or 
collecting apparent biological material of unknown origin. Sampling for DNA analysis may also 
occur in relation to victims of crime, such as through a medical examination following a sexual 
assault or as part of a post-mortem process. 
 
Following an incident, a laboratory must determine which, if any, DNA samples will be analysed 
and in what sequence. The laboratory’s aim is to conduct an efficient analysis so as to produce 
the most probative evidence or effective intelligence in relation to an incident. In doing so, a 
forensic scientist will consider a variety of factors, including the type of offence and any known 
pre-existing association between a suspect and the location of the crime. 
 
Efficiency would be expected to be a strong driver of the platform used for analysis. Where a 
suspect is known to be associated with a location, conducting expensive trace DNA analysis 
would be a futile exercise. Likewise, a laboratory would likely favour fast and cost-effective 
processing of DNA samples to develop identification markers suitable for DNA database 
searches, if there is a reasonable prospect the unknown suspect will be identified through those 
database searches. 
 
However, where it is not believed a suspect will be identified by database searches, or those 
searches are undertaken with nil results, the MPS platform provides a variety of additional 
capabilities to provide intelligence to investigators. 
 
The MPS platform itself has wide application depending on the genetic targets employed by the 
MPS kit. It is therefore possible for an MPS instrument to be configured between runs to 
provide entirely different genetic information.[8] 
 
The combination of all of these factors will determine whether a DNA sample generates: 
• no information (that is, analysis of the sample reveals no usable genetic information); 
• identification markers or a combination or mixture of markers, which may be suitable for 
database comparison; 
• additional genetic information, with potential suitability for prediction of ancestry, surname, 
EVCs or prediction of medical status. 
 
Surname and medical status prediction are evolving, the former being explored with both MPS 
platforms and other non-MPS technology. While these potential applications are considered in 
this PIA, the main privacy implications assessed relate to prediction of ancestry and EVCs. This 
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PIA does not consider moving beyond medical status prediction for identification purposes (for 
example, predicting whether an individual is likely to have been prescribed an unusual 
medication) to behavioural or psychological predictions for the purposes of profiling a suspect. 
 
It should be noted that some potential uses cross these boundaries. Should reliable markers for 
gait or voice characteristics be identified, for example, there could be some dispute as to 
whether they are EVCs or behavioural predictions. 
 
 
What genetic information is being held? 
 
The FBI’s CODIS database currently contains more than twenty DNA markers:[9] 
 
• CSF1PO 
• FGA 
• THO1 
• TPOX 
• VWA 
• D3S1358 
• D5S818 
• D7S820 
• D8S1179 
• D13S317 
• D16S539 
• D18S51 
• D21S11 
• D1S1656 
• D2S441 
• D2S1338 
• D10S1248 
• D12S391 
• D19S433 
• D22S1045 
• AMXY 
 
If a laboratory simply substituted an MPS-based platform for its existing DNA processing 
capabilities, using a suitable MPS kit containing only those markers, there would be little 
change to the baseline privacy position. The laboratory would simply be using a different 
method of DNA analysis to derive the same genetic information, for comparison with DNA 
obtained from suspects and victims through existing voluntary or coercive collection processes. 
While MPS-based platforms provide more sequence information, which may be phenotypically 
informative, such a one for one replacement technology would pose little additional privacy risk 
when compared to current DNA processing capabilities. 
 
As previously discussed, derivation of genetic information at the twenty identity markers listed 
above is not entirely immune from privacy concerns. The familial nature of DNA, its 
identification of biological gender, and more recent research into whether some markers 
thought to be ‘non-coding’ could, in fact, inform some predictions, continue to present 
potential privacy issues. However, for the purposes of this PIA, these privacy considerations are 
also a feature of existing DNA capabilities which have remained unchanged for nearly 30 years. 
 
One significant advantage of MPS-based platforms is the ability to process a significantly larger 
number of markers, many of which are specifically chosen as genetically informative markers. 
Recommendation 3 
Entities considering future technology change beyond the scope of this PIA, such as targeting 
genetic markers for behaviour or whole genome sequencing for forensic analysis, should 
consider whether another PIA is required. 
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For example, the llumina® ForenSeq™ DNA Signature Prep Kit contains 94 autosomal human 
identity single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), 27 autosomal short-tandem repeat (STR) 
markers, the sex-determining amelogenin marker, 24 Y chromosome STRs, 7 X chromosome 
STRs, 56 autosomal ancestry informative SNPs and 22 autosomal phenotype informative SNPs 
(for eye and hair colour). While still only the tiniest fraction of the human genome, these 
markers are sufficient to inform a range of phenotype and ancestry predictions.[10] 
 
 
Analysis and access to genetic information 
 
When compared to the existing state, MPS-based platforms reveal more genetic information to 
forensic scientists and, subject to existing and proposed controls, could potentially reveal more 
genetic information to investigators and the courts, either directly or derived from reporting of 
phenotypes. As noted, MPS can provide more sequence information than previous 
technologies. This, in part, is a product of the disparate uses of MPS and its more widespread 
use in fields of medical research. 
 
Genetic information derived from MPS analysis could include information falling into three 
categories: 
 
• Raw genetic data: Specific bases relating to the genome of an individual, known or 
unknown. 
 
• Processed genetic data directly relevant to predictions of bio-geographical ancestry 
(BGA) or externally visible characteristics (EVC) of an individual, known or unknown. 
 
• Other processed genetic data, should it become operationally feasible, predicting other 
individual attributes such as the hereditary medical status of an individual, known or 
unknown. 
 
The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) classes genetic information as ‘sensitive information’.[11] As such, in 
some circumstances it can be subject to additional requirements concerning its collection, use 
and disclosure. While the primary purpose of collection and use is to provide intelligence 
support to law enforcement investigations, primarily by assisting in identifying an individual 
through their genetic traits, the data itself poses other privacy risks once associated with a 
known individual: 
 
• Processed genetic data concerning BGA or EVC could be used to identify or challenge an 
individual’s cultural heritage or familial links. 
  
• Other processed genetic data would be informative of other genetic conditions. While 
there is an argument that that information might assist law enforcement, it could also 
lead to other presumptions about an individual, such as their state of health. 
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• Raw genetic data poses two risks, depending on the specific markers analysed. It could 
be further analysed (either in isolation or with other genetic information known to be 
associated with an individual) to make predictions based on current research 
knowledge of the human genome. Alternatively, the data could be stored and analysed 
to make predictions based on future discoveries regarding the human genome.  
 
The sensitive nature of genetic information therefore warrants an appropriate level of 
safeguarding. While used as the basis for intelligence product, the raw genetic data should be 
retained securely and be accessible only by authorised individuals. Entities using MPS could 
maintain these safeguards by examining workflows in the laboratory, identifying any points in 
the analysis or reporting process where a ‘data spill’ could occur or where unauthorised 
individuals could obtain access to genetic information.  
 
Further considerations may apply if MPS workflows could overlap with court reporting. While 
MPS may be employed for intelligence purposes, the platform can also be employed to analyse 
identification markers. Where this occurs, the possibility of raw genetic data falling into a court 
discovery or subpoena process should be considered. In many jurisdictions, court discovery 
processes are extensive and a key element of the justice system. 
 
While existing DNA capabilities could require a laboratory to produce raw data (such as 
electropherograms) as part of a court process, those DNA capabilities were designed to select 
markers with minimal genetic privacy risks. MPS therefore carries greater risks to individuals, 
including the potential re-identification of other genetic datasets, if put on a public record. 
 
The privacy risks around processed genetic data for BGA or EVC primarily relate to how 
information is understood and used by those tasked with taking the intelligence product and 
actioning it. While phenotyping can be a valuable tool for investigators, privacy rights will only 
be maintained where its purpose and limitations are fully understood. Investigators may, for 
example, target a particular ethnic group based on BGA prediction. A ‘dragnet’ of individuals 
Recommendation 4 
Entities using MPS analysis should ensure that genetic information and, in particular, raw 
genetic data is appropriately secured to prevent unauthorised access, use or disclosure. 
 
Recommendation 5 
Entities using MPS analysis should keep court reporting processes and intelligence processes 
distinct, to maximise the opportunities to negotiate during discovery or subpoena processes 
and keep third-party genetic information off the public record wherever possible. Entities 
should also consider potential third-party access rights under freedom of information 
processes, where they are applicable. 
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with particular physical characteristics could be attempted. Both of these approaches could 
undermine confidence in the technology and in jurisdictions such as the United States could 
result in legal challenge. 
 
The release of information to investigators can represent a higher risk to privacy where: 
• it reveals EVC or BGA prediction that is likely to be misinterpreted; or 
• reveals information about an individual other than an EVC or BGA.  
 
 
 
Information sharing 
 
Transfer of information from one entity to another can occur in two situations. The first is 
where an MPS capability is ‘outsourced’ or otherwise provided to law enforcement agencies on 
a fee-for-service basis. Such models could be all-inclusive, or could involve the use of an MPS 
platform followed by further data analysis by another entity (government or private sector) to 
generate additional intelligence information. 
 
The second situation arises in relation to research and development, and involves collaboration 
efforts between different entities so as to enhance the predictive capabilities of an MPS 
platform. 
 
The first situation can generally be managed by appropriate consideration of privacy and 
security requirements in any contractual arrangement. Where any outsourced or fee-for-
service model is negotiated, both parties should assess how privacy and security requirements, 
and other privacy enhancements, can be implemented and which party bears the responsibility. 
Auditing or certification arrangements could also be considered, particularly where an entity 
believes that there is a high risk of reputational harm in the event of a ‘data spill’ or other 
privacy breach. 
Recommendation 6 
When operationalising an MPS platform, entities should give consideration to appropriate 
awareness training for police or investigators. Results or reports from MPS platforms should, 
where practicable, allow for discussions and guidance to be given by the scientists to 
investigators tasked with making operational decisions based on the content. Additional 
explanatory information should also be included in reports, where possible, to aide in 
interpretation. 
Recommendation 7 
Any outsourcing or fee-for-service arrangement involving MPS technology should give 
consideration to privacy risks and, in particular, which obligations fall to which parties. 
Auditing or certification requirement could also be used to mitigate risk, where appropriate. 
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The second situation, involving research collaboration, requires even more careful analysis. It is 
unlikely that a victim or suspect in a criminal matter could be regarded as having consented to 
their genetic data being used for research, even where that data has been de-identified. Where 
data is to be shared between laboratories, extreme care would be needed to guard against 
inappropriate secondary use. 
 
Withdrawal of consent 
 
The collection of personal information generally requires an individual’s consent, and that 
consent can be withdrawn in certain circumstances.[12, 13] In the context of genetic 
information derived from DNA collected at crime scenes, and of unknown origin, issues of 
consent do not apply. If an entity proposes to use an MPS platform, particularly phenotype 
prediction, in relation to samples of known origin, issues of consent may become relevant.  
 
The use of MPS for phenotype prediction for samples of known origin would appear 
nonsensical. There is no law enforcement benefit in predicting EVC or BGA for a person who is 
already known to police.  However, the MPS platform itself could present cost benefits and 
economies of scale for forensic laboratories, compared to older DNA technologies. A laboratory 
may therefore elect to run a single model or type of MPS platform for both crime scene and 
reference samples. 
 
 
Consent would be relevant in relation to volunteers and contributors to known components of 
DNA mixtures, if their identity is or becomes reasonably apparent. While a victim of crime may, 
for example, agree to provide a reference sample to exclude their DNA profile from being 
uploaded from crime scene samples to a national DNA database, the question becomes more 
vexed when analysing a DNA sample of mixed origin using EVC or BGA capabilities. Some of the 
genetic data generated would be from the known contributor. 
Recommendation 8 
Any outsourcing, fee-for-service or other collaboration involving MPS should give careful 
consideration to risks of secondary use, such as the diversion of genetic data into research and 
development initiatives without informed consent. Similar considerations may apply where an 
operational laboratory runs an in-house research and development program. 
Recommendation 9 
Where an entity proposes to use MPS technology for reference samples, consideration should 
be given to deriving genetic information only from DNA markers useful for comparison 
purposes. Where this is not feasible, EVC, BGA or any other medically sensitive information 
should be segmented with access restricted at the earliest opportunity during the analysis 
process. 
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Guidelines issued by the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner require that entities 
subject to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) respond appropriately and, in most cases, make no further 
use of personal information if consent is withdrawn.[12] It is likely that a volunteer could 
expressly withdraw consent in relation to a reference sample, but not in relation to so-called 
discarded DNA. A component of that discarded DNA may have come from the volunteer, and 
may then be uploaded to a DNA database or subject to EVC or BGA prediction. 
 
 
The processes around consent and withdrawal of consent are largely unchanged from previous 
DNA technology. However, as DNA analysis still has a high dependence on community 
cooperation, particularly of victims of crime, and a technology change could result in concern 
about misuse of genetic information, entities should carefully consider their approach. 
  
 
Access to personal information 
 
Individuals generally have a right to request access to their own personal information. See, for 
example, Australian Privacy Principle 12 in Sch 1, Privacy Act 1988 (Cth); Privacy Act of 1974 
(US), § 552a(d); Data Protection Act 1988 (UK), Part 2 and Act on the Protection of Personal 
Information Held by Administrative Organs (Japan), article 12. An individual may develop an 
interest in the genetic information held by an entity, either in raw form or in the form of 
analysis of EVC, BGA or other forensically relevant information. Entities will need to consider 
the relevant approach to releasing this information, assuming that no exemptions apply due to 
operational sensitivities at the time. 
 
A right of access could arise in relation to reference samples, the known component of a DNA 
mixture obtained through a forensic procedure (generally performed on a victim of crime), or in 
relation to discarded DNA (including mixtures) collected from a crime scene and subsequently 
re-identified through an investigative process. 
Recommendation 10 
Entities should consider relevant privacy safeguards when analysing samples of mixed origin 
using an MPS platform, where there is a known contributor such as a victim of crime. Similar 
policies of segmenting and restricting access to EVC, BGA or other medically sensitive 
information in raw genetic data should, whenever it is feasible, apply at the earliest opportunity 
during the analysis process. 
 
Recommendation 11 
Entities moving to an MPS platform should review their policies and procedures concerning 
obtaining consent from individuals, particularly volunteers, and whether any changes are 
needed to inform those consenting of any relevant new capabilities of an MPS platform.  
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Reference samples and DNA obtained through forensic procedures 
 
When taking reference samples for analysis with an MPS platform, entities have an opportunity 
to fully inform an individual and, except in the case of samples taken coercively, obtain relevant 
consent. The consent or information process can therefore detail the process applicable for 
subsequently requesting access to an individual’s personal information. 
 
Discarded DNA 
 
Where samples are collected from discarded DNA and analysed using MPS (including prediction 
of EVC or BGA) normal consent arrangements would not apply. As such, an entity comes into 
possession of genetic information without any form of consent or an opportunity to provide 
information or disclaimers in relation to its use. This stands in contrast to other situations in 
which genetic information is usually obtained, such as medical testing or medical research. 
 
Once re-identified, an entity may be asked by the donor to provide a copy of their personal 
information. More concerning, that individual may later seek legal redress against an individual, 
should the raw genetic information reveal genetic predisposition to disease. 
 
 
The right not to know 
 
Current DNA reporting capabilities can lead to conclusions about biological parentage. The 
possibility of inadvertent release of information about whether a parent is biologically related 
Recommendation 12 
An entity should consider whether to include, in any relevant consent form, information about 
rights of access to personal information. The entity should also consider advising donors that 
the entity will not proactively release any information as to health status, even if this health 
information is readily apparent from the genetic information. 
 
Recommendation 13 
An entity should ensure that, before using MPS operationally, the agency’s privacy policy or 
other relevant governance provides necessary guidance about the use to which the agency may 
put genetic information obtained from discarded DNA. Importantly, this policy should specify 
that the entity will not proactively release genetic information or information as to health 
status, even if the donor of the sample later becomes known and even if this health information 
is readily apparent from the genetic information. Consideration should be given to how this 
aligns with any statutory requirement to release copies of results to the donor. 
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has been an issue that forensic science has had to manage over many years. This issue became 
particularly relevant with the widespread use of DNA testing for missing persons or disaster 
victim identification. 
 
MPS capabilities extend this risk into areas such as genetic ancestry information and potentially 
medically relevant information about individuals, known and unknown. There is at least some 
possibility that a suspect, identified through the use of EVC and BGA information from MPS, 
could develop a suspicion about their biological parentage if the police report differed from 
their own beliefs as to their genetic makeup. 
 
Likewise, exploiting health status information for investigative purposes must be balanced 
carefully with the ‘right not to know’. The Australian National Health and Medical Research 
Council notes that ‘[i]t cannot be assumed that everyone will wish to know that they might have 
inherited a disorder present in their family’.[14]  
 
 
Anonymity/Pseudonymity 
 
As with existing DNA technology, it is difficult if not impossible to assure anonymity or 
pseudonymity in a forensic DNA process. Indeed, the primary goal of forensic DNA analysis is to 
assist in identifying the likely donor of genetic material obtained in connection with a particular 
scene of crime. 
 
 
  
Recommendation 14 
Entities should ensure that their implementation of MPS considers the possibility of inadvertent 
release of information such as biological parentage or genetic ancestry information, and 
mitigate this risk if possible. Entities should also balance the ‘right not to know’ with 
investigative priorities if considering the use of health information for identification purposes. 
Recommendation 15 
Entities should ensure that, before using MPS operationally, the agency’s privacy policy is 
reviewed to ensure that there are no express assurances of anonymity or pseudonymity in 
relation to forensic identification sciences. 
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Privacy Risks and Benefits 
 
Community attitudes to genetic privacy 
 
Genomic analysis and predictive health capabilities, whether used in a forensic, research or 
diagnostic setting, are highly dependent on the sharing of personal information by other 
individuals.[15] Indeed, very little could be gleaned from the human genome without a 
comparative analysis. The adoption of MPS capabilities for forensic purposes should adhere to 
community expectations on the use of genetic information. Given its reliance predominantly on 
discarded DNA from crime scenes, society must accept that their skin cells or other genetic 
material could be swept up and analysed without their knowledge or consent. The privacy 
checks and balances, therefore, are important to maintaining public confidence even though 
the public’s attitude to genetic analysis is constantly changing. 
 
New MPS capabilities 
 
This PIA assumes that new MPS predictive capabilities will likely emerge in the future, 
becoming available as part of new or existing MPS kits. Laboratories themselves may not drive 
these changes, with instrument manufacturers potentially expanding kits to include analysis of 
different genetic markers. 
 
Entities need to consider what processes should apply where new testing capabilities are made 
available, and how to ensure that any privacy intrusion is balanced against the perceived 
investigative benefit. There may be a temptation to provide as much information about an 
unknown crime scene sample to investigators as possible. However, this could result in 
undermining public confidence in the capability and reduced public cooperation with police 
investigations, particularly in the volunteers providing reference DNA samples.[16] Entities 
should consider Recommendation 2, above, concerning undertaking a new PIA if the capabilities 
of MPS significantly evolve. 
 
Wider use of an MPS platform 
 
Changes to the privacy impact are not necessarily confined to new MPS capabilities. A shift in 
the application of an MPS platform, from cold cases to all crime scenes, or from crime scene to 
reference samples, could also result in unforeseen consequences in terms of individual privacy, 
and may necessitate a new PIA process. 
Recommendation 16 
Entities adopting MPS in a staged manner, and later broadening application to more crime types 
or for the more efficient analysis of reference samples, should consider whether a new PIA is 
necessary. See also Recommendation 9. 
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Effect on DNA ‘Dragnets’ 
 
DNA ‘dragnets’ or widespread sampling of a population to help solve a particular crime, has 
occurred in a number of countries. Sampling is almost always restricted to a small geographic 
area, based on the scene of the crime, and further restricted by gender or ethnic group (based 
on eyewitness evidence or, in the case of gender, potentially results of DNA analysis of the 
amelogenin genetic marker). 
 
The use of MPS for EVC or BGA prediction in this instance may serve to more accurately refine 
the target population of a DNA dragnet, where it is appropriate. For example, where presently 
police may propose a dragnet of all male residents of a particular town, BGA or EVC could limit 
this intrusion based on prediction of appearance or ancestry. This, of course, must be 
considered carefully to avoid targeting of particular ethnic groups and, in the United States, 
consideration of the Fourth Amendment further restrains appropriate use of this technique.[16] 
 
Compliance with Australian Privacy Principles 
 
Australian Privacy Principle How compliance requirements can be met 
1 — open and transparent 
management of personal 
information 
Compliance is achieved by conducting a PIA, documenting 
policies and procedures concerning use of MPS, and revising 
and reviewing documents through normal business practice. 
2 — anonymity and 
pseudonymity 
It is impractical for an entity assisting in identification in a 
forensic context to allow for anonymity or pseudonymity in 
most instances. 
3 — collection of solicited 
personal information 
Compliance (in relation to personal information and the further 
restricted sensitive information) is achieved by ensuring that 
collection is directly related to an entity’s functions or activities 
and, further, that the entity is a relevant enforcement body. 
4 — dealing with 
unsolicited personal 
information 
This requirement is not generally applicable to MPS. 
5 — notification of the 
collection of personal 
information 
The notification of collection of genetic information to the 
original donor is generally not reasonable in the circumstances. 
6 — use or disclosure of 
personal information 
The release of any information derived from MPS analysis is 
made compliant by way of Australian Privacy Principle 6.2(b), 
concerning use or disclosure under an Australian law, or 6.2(e), 
concerning enforcement-related activities. 
7 — direct marketing Not applicable. 
8 — cross-border 
disclosure of personal 
information 
Cross-border disclosure could arise in circumstances where an 
entity outsources its MPS analysis or where it is necessary for 
an enforcement related purpose. 
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Australian Privacy Principle How compliance requirements can be met 
9 — adoption, use or 
disclosure of government 
related identifiers 
Not applicable. 
10 — quality of personal 
information 
Given the predictive nature of EVC and BGA capabilities, it is 
reasonable for an entity not to maintain analytical information 
that is completely accurate. 
11 — security of personal 
information 
Compliance can be achieved by ensuring that information 
security requirements are adhered to. 
12 — access to personal 
information 
Entities can achieve compliance by ensuring that processes and 
procedures allow for reasonable access to MPS data and 
predictions (see Recommendations 12, 13 and 14). 
13 — correction of 
personal information 
Given the predictive nature of EVC and BGA capabilities, 
correction of personal information would not be expected to 
arise. 
 
 
Compliance with United Kingdom Data Protection Principles 
 
United Kingdom Data 
Protection Principle 
How compliance requirements can be met 
1 — personal data 
processed fairly and 
lawfully 
Compliance is obtained as the data is required to be processed 
for the administration of justice. 
2 — obtained for one or 
more specified and lawful 
purposes 
Disproportionate effort would be required to notify unknown 
individuals of the collection of their personal data. 
3 — adequate, relevant 
and not excessive 
Compliance can be met by implementing processes and 
procedures to limit the data produced using MPS, or to de-
identify or destroy any unnecessary genetic data, where lawful 
and appropriate. 
4 — accurate and, where 
necessary, kept up to date 
Given the predictive nature of EVC and BGA capabilities, it is 
reasonable for an entity not to maintain analytical information 
that is completely accurate. 
5 — not be kept for longer 
than is necessary 
Certain genetic information and analysis from MPS may need to 
be retained in accordance with other legal requirements or for 
court purposes. 
6 — processed in 
accordance with the rights 
of data subjects 
Entities can achieve compliance by ensuring that processes and 
procedures allow for reasonable access to MPS data and 
predictions (see Recommendations 12-14), and ensuring that 
data is not shared or disclosed (see Recommendations 4-8). 
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United Kingdom Data 
Protection Principle 
How compliance requirements can be met 
7 — unauthorised or 
unlawful processing or 
accidental loss 
Entities can achieve compliance by ensuring that processes and 
procedures allow for reasonable access to MPS data and 
predictions (see Recommendations 12, 13 and 14). 
8 — international transfer 
outside of the European 
Union 
Cross-border disclosure, outside of the European Union, could 
arise in circumstances where an entity outsources its MPS 
analysis or where it necessary for an enforcement related 
purpose. 
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Risk Mitigation Strategies 
 
‘Masking’, encrypting or segmenting personal information 
(See also Recommendations 5, 9 and 10) 
 
A key element to ensuring community confidence in the forensic use of MPS is to ensure that 
personal information or data is handled appropriately. A crime scene examiner or forensic 
laboratory analyst cannot visually distinguish between the genetic material of a suspect, victim 
or bystander. Only by exploiting the sample to derive genetic information can conclusions be 
made about the possible origin of genetic material. 
 
As the forensic process continues, the segmenting, deletion, masking or encryption of data no 
longer necessary to the forensic process can be a valuable tool to protect individual privacy. 
 
This approach could include: 
 tight controls about who can access the raw genetic data developed through an MPS 
process; 
 early deletion of markers not related to DNA database identification, where legally 
permitted, if a laboratory chooses to use an MPS platform for reference samples and 
does not use a separate kit excluding those markers from analysis; 
 restricting access to EVC, BGA or other non-DNA database markers for crime scene 
samples, until the identification markers have been compared to reference samples for 
the case and other available DNA databases. 
 delineation between raw genetic data and processed analytical information 
(intelligence), when releasing that information to investigators or the general public. 
 
Release of information to the courts 
 
Courts will also need to consider the way in which genetic information from MPS will be 
introduced into proceedings. While genetic information may fall within the ambit of a subpoena 
or a discovery process, segmenting the data will make decisions of courts or tribunals far easier 
than if raw data and processed data relating to a range of individuals is intertwined in a case 
file. Courts can then make informed decisions about how, for example, the genetic information 
of a victim from a mixed source profile will be managed during a trial process.  While the 
discovery and subpoena processes can be extensive, it is within the power of the courts to exert 
a level of control of how information is to be managed, including ordering non-disclosure.  
 
Such court control can help mitigate against instances where full disclosure is relevant in the 
interests of justice, but where disclosure could be to the detriment of the privacy of other 
individuals, such as victims of crime. 
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Freedom of information Act and other rights of access 
 
Similar considerations apply in relation to other means of obtaining information held by an 
entity. Segmenting genetic information will make managing such requests, including requests 
by an individual for their own personal information, far less complex. Adopting clear processes 
for information management provides a range of privacy and information access benefits 
throughout the forensic process. 
 
Information security 
 
Privacy laws generally put entities under an obligation to manage the security of personal 
information, and require action to be taken in relation to any unauthorised release of 
information (a ‘data spill’). Entities can reduce risk by implementing appropriate security 
protocols around both electronic and hardcopy records. 
 
Forensic Reporting 
(See also Recommendation 6) 
 
MPS analysis yields intelligence outcomes for investigators. The inappropriate targeting of 
individuals based on EVC or BGA, or other privacy intrusions, can best be managed by training 
and education of investigators, as well as ensuring that those consuming intelligence products 
have direct access to forensic scientists to explain the relevant report and the underlying 
statistical model. 
 
An entity implementing an MPS platform should consider feedback processes from the end 
consumers of their analysis. This feedback can assist in refining their reporting format. 
 
  
Recommendation 17 
Entities should ensure that processes for the handling of electronic and hardcopy records 
containing genetic information meet all relevant security standards and requirements, as well as 
any data retention or archiving requirements. 
 
Recommendation 18 
Entities should consider gathering feedback on any MPS analysis provided to investigators, and 
to consider strategies to enhance reporting and privacy compliance. 
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De-identification and re-identification 
 
The potential for genetic data to be re-identified, by aggregation or comparison with other 
available datasets, adds to the privacy risk.[17, 18] An approach that ‘masks’, segments or 
encrypts genetic data during the forensic process will help to mitigate this (see 
Recommendations 5, 9 and 10). Likewise, ensuring compliance with security requirements 
concerning electronic and hardcopy records (Recommendation 17) helps to ensure that genetic 
information will not fall into the wrong hands. 
 
 
Deletion 
 
The timely deletion of genetic data requires a careful balancing of: 
 individuals’ rights and expectations concerning their personal privacy, particularly if they 
are found not to be associated with a criminal activity; 
 the entity’s quality assurance requirements and interest in maintaining raw genetic data 
in a form that can assist with detecting and remedying any quality concerns; 
 discovery and disclosure obligations to the courts or other oversight bodies. 
 
While it may be possible to omit certain genetic information (such as genetic marker details 
concerning a bystander or a victim of crime) from analysis and reporting, entities would need to 
carefully consider whether deletion of raw genetic data is lawful and feasible, particularly with 
respect to disclosure, data retention or archiving requirements. An approach of tightly 
restricting access to genetic data may be preferable. 
 
While actual deletion of data may not be feasible, access to genetic data that is not probative or 
relevant to a case could be so tightly restricted as to approach logical deletion (for example, 
restricting access to the laboratory quality manager or IT administrator). 
  
Recommendation 19 
Entities should ensure that their privacy processes include steps to be taken in the event of a 
suspected genetic ‘data spill’ (deliberate or inadvertent), including taking all reasonable steps to 
contain any breach. 
 
Recommendation 20 
Entities should consider their approach to deleting or tightly restricting genetic data, in cases 
where it is possible to make an assessment that it does not (or no longer) has any probative 
value. 
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Conclusions 
 
There are a number of practical steps that an entity can take in implementing MPS for forensic 
use, so as to ensure both adherence to any applicable privacy laws and overall minimisation of 
intrusion to personal privacy. MPS provides many opportunities for law enforcement. However, 
maintaining public confidence in the technology will be critical to its successful implementation 
and use. 
 
Stepping through the various recommendations of this Model PIA, as they apply to an entity, 
will assist in determining how a privacy compliant framework can be put in place for MPS 
analysis of both crime scene and reference samples. 
 
As with any technology, new capabilities will evolve over time. These capabilities may enhance 
or challenge assumptions as to personal privacy. It is also important to review privacy 
compliance periodically and, in particular, before any broadening of the technical capabilities or 
application of MPS within a forensic setting. 
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